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ABSTRACT: In Kierkegaard’s treatment of the concept of reality, possibility, 
freedom (the not-necessity of the history) both in the Concept of Anxiety and 
in Philosophical Fragments is possible to make out Schelling’s meontology, 
that is the philosophical discourse concerning the negation of the actual 
being of something, but not its possibility. The article makes first a survey 
of the latest philosophy of Schelling, the so-called “positive philosophy” 
and explain its methodological meaning for the development of philosophy 
of Mythology and philosophy of Revelation. Its shows why Kierkegaard’s 
thought could have been attracted by Schelling’s Spätphilosophie and its 
way of treating the concepts of possibility and reality in opposition to 
Hegel’s “negative philosophy”, but in the end it shows why Kierkegaard 
could not accept even Schelling’s speculation.
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La meontología de Schelling y 
el concepto de posibilidad en Kierkegaard
RESUMEN: En el tratamiento de Kierkegaard del concepto de realidad, 
posibilidad, libertad (la no necesidad  de la historia), tanto en El concepto de 
la angustia como en  sus Migajas filosóficas, se puede apreciar la meontología 
de Schelling, es decir, el discurso filosófico relativo a la negación del ser 
real de alguna cosa, pero no de su posibilidad. El artículo realiza un primer 
estudio sobre la última filosofía de Schelling, la llamada “filosofía positiva” 
y explica su significado metodológico para el desarrollo de la filosofía de la 
Mitología y la filosofía de la Revelación. Muestra por qué el pensamiento 
de Kierkegaard podría haberse sentido atraído por la Spätphilosophie de 
Schelling y su manera de tratar los conceptos de posibilidad y realidad en 
oposición a la “filosofía negativa” de Hegel, pero al finalizar muestra por 
qué Kierkegaard no pudo aceptar incluso la especulación de Schelling.
PALABRAS CLAVE: empirismo; libertad; Idealismo; Kierkegaard; 
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In making a survey of Kierkegaard’s relationship to Schelling in 
particular moving on from The Concept of Anxiety, I would like take 
both this concept (anxiety) and the work dedicated to it as a point 
of departure – better said an “occasion” – in order to investigate the 
way in which Kierkegaard drew some philosophical intuitions, ideas 
and concepts from the latest philosophy of Schelling. This will be 
done by means of establishing a kind of route along the Schelling 
“river”: a conceptual river that Kierkegaard seems to have carefully 
followed and from which he also drank several times. 
I will show in special how in Kierkegaard’s treatment of the con-
cept of possibility (as well as in the treatment of freedom, thus in 
the not-necessity of the history) both in the Concept of Anxiety and in 
the contemporary Philosophical Fragments,1 for instance, there seems 
to be possible to make out Schelling’s meontology. I refer with this 
concept to the distinction Schelling regained from Plato’s Sophist2 
between the Greek “subjective” and “objective” negation, m¾ Ôn 
and oÙk Ôn in order to found Good’s freedom in the creation. Let 
me recall that while the Greek negation oÙk totally denies the reality 
of something both in thought and in actuality, the negation m¾ just 
denies the actual being of something, but not its possibility, thus 
defining something as “not existing”, but still possible.
The root of Schelling’s latest speculation – the “positive philoso-
phy” – has its origin in the attempt of reaching philosophically the 
so-called “positive”, that is the true, historical, free reality, without 
falling into the logical pantheism. And this was exactly what Kierkeg-
aard was interested in. As it is well known, the whole discussion 
concerning the possibility of elaborating a philosophical perspec-
tive able to come out of the “negative philosophy” (this is the way 
in which Schelling indicates a merely logical perspective) in order 
to grasp the reality without giving up to a scientific approach, con-
cerned others besides Schelling and Kierkegaard. 
Just before Hegel’s death, a great number of voices (even within 
Hegel’s followers) had raised in order to criticize some points of the 
1 Philosophical Fragments came out the 13th of June 1844, but it had been probably 
composed before March and the end of May 1844. The Concept of Anxiety came out 
the 17th of June 1844, but it had been written before. On the question of dating see 
the commentary [K] to Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter [SKS], ed. by Søren Kierkegaard For-
skningscenteret, Gads Forlag, Copenhagen 1997ff., vol. 4: K4: Philosophical Fragments 
by Jette Knudsen and Johnny Kondrup, pp.171-196, and on The Concept of anxiety, 
by Søren Bruun, pp. 305-339. They were originally both signed with the name of Ki-
erkegaard himself then the name was replaced with the actual ones. On that, see also 
Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge 2003, pp. 40ff.




System, in particular the interpretation of the first category of Logic, 
that is the category of Being, and its identity with Nothing, from 
which the Becoming should have followed. I will not go over the 
complex and long discussion about this point now,3 but I will just 
emphasize some very important theoretical joints in order to under-
stand Kierkegaard’s interest for Schelling’s so-called Spätphilosophie, 
since Schelling’s position has had the peculiarity of presenting also 
a pars construens and not only the elaboration of the destruens one.
The most incisive objection to Hegel’s first Section of Logic had 
focused on the identity between Being and Nothing, because this 
identity would be only a sterile tautology from which Movement 
and Becoming cannot result, unless Being was already something 
determinate. It means that in the Hegelian pure and indeterminate 
Being it is not true that the Nothing is thought, but instead, that 
simply the Nothing is not a thought. This was precisely what Karl 
Werder said in 1841,4 and already Schelling during his second stay 
in Munich since 18275 had actually formulated the same objection. 
Even Feuerbach in 18396 had raised a similar argument, saying with 
Aristotle that the Nothing cannot be thought, because when it is 
thought, it is already determined, this meaning that it is something 
existing and no longer “Nothing”. The thought can only think some-
thing that is. Moreover the Thought itself is an existing activity, it 
is something real. 
What Hegel seemed to have forgotten, in a sense, was also the real 
and subjective definiteness of the act of thinking opposite to the 
abstractness without any contents of the pure Being.
But following this direction, we could also mention in the same 
period of time the so-called Spätidealisten Immanuel Hermann Fichte 
and Christian Hermann Weisse with their periodical «Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie und spekulative Theologie», to which Kierkegaard was a 
3 On this topic I would like to refer to the monograph I have published in 2007 
and to the bibliography it contains: Kierkegaard uditore di Schelling: le lezioni berlinesi 
sulla “Filosofia della Rrivelazione”, 1841-1842. Tracce della filosofia schellinghiana nell’o-
pera di Søren Kierkegaard, Mimesis, Milano 2007, pp. 17-39.
4 Karl Werder, Logik. Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. 
1. Abteilung, Berlin 1841, pp. 35 ss.
5 Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, in SW, I, X, pp. 1-200, in particular pp. 
127 ss.
6 L. Feuerbach, Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie, in «Hallische Jahrbücher für 
deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst», 1839, nn. 208-216 (30th August to 9th Septem-
ber), coll. 1657-1725, then in Sämtliche Werke, ed. by W. Bolin and F. Jodl, Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstatt 1959, vol. II, in particular pp. 195-202.
arS BrEviS 2011
257
SchELLing’S mEontoLogy and thE concEpt oF poSSiBiLity in KiErKEgaard
subscriber, and their accusation of formal truth and material falsity7 
of the Hegelian Logic. 
In short, all this criticism accused Hegel of having pushed Logic 
beyond its intrinsic limits, of having passed it off as something 
that it wasn’t, that is, in Schelling’s terms, a “positive” philosophy. 
According to its critics, Hegel’s Logic was indeed unable to come to 
the “positive” unless by introducing it surreptitiously from outside. 
This was exactly what Schelling wrote in 1834 in its famous Preface 
to the German translation of Victor Cousin’s Fragments philosophiques, 
a text which also Kierkegaard had in his library  and that had in 
the meanwhile become a kind of manifesto against Hegel’s Logic:
The logical self-movement of the Concept held only as 
long as it remained within the limits of a purely logic 
dimension; […] The first presupposition of this philoso-
phy that pretended to be free from any presupposition 
was that the pure logic concept, in itself, has as its 
quality or its nature to pass in other, to go beyond itself 
(the subjectivity of the philosopher should be indeed 
totally neglected) toward its contrary, and then coming 
back to itself again: something that could be thought 
of a real and living entity, but that concerning the pure 
concept neither can be thought nor imagined, but only 
said. […] the passage [from the Idea] to the nature is 
not a dialectical one, but its is something different for 
which does not exist any category within a purely ra-
tional system, and for which neither its inventor is able 
to find a category within his own system. This attempt 
[…] is just an episode in the history of philosophy, […] 
useful in order to show that it is impossible to reach the 
concrete reality through a purely rational way.8
And we can also find the same argument in the first series of lectures 
he held in Berlin, especially in Lecture no. 9 (beginning of December 
1841), something that we can also read in Kierkegaard’s notes:
When the demands of the negative on the positive are 
not satisfied, it [the negative] itself is transformed into 
the positive.
7 C.H. Weisse, Gründzuge der Metaphysik, Hamburg 1835, p. IV.
8 Über französische und deutsche Philosophie. Aus dem Französischen von Dr. Hubert 
Beckers. Nebst einer beurtheilenden Vorrede des Herrn Geheimenraths von Schelling, Stutt-




Hegel did this; he made the philosophy of identity into 
positive philosophy, the only philosophy.9
Now the task of philosophy had become exactly the recovering of 
the non-inferable becoming, but without renouncing to the scien-
tific discourse, the philosophical discourse. And this was precisely 
Schelling’s concern, as we can read in his inaugural address in Berlin 
of November, 15th 1841, when he quoted the Hegelian Eduard Gans 
and his objection according to which «a System can be confuted 
only by another System». Therefore the point of departure of such 
a project could just be the individuation of the real nature of the 
Experience, and consequently in the light of this answer, the recon-
sideration of which relationship between Being and Thought could 
be the right one. And with “Thought”, what is here meant is not 
the pure Thought without any conditions, only able to give birth 
to «stillborn products»,10 but a Thought which is itself a concrete 
reality connected to a thinking real subject.
This was actually a need that Schelling had already pointed out 
also in his Erlangen Vorträge two decades before, in 1821, when he 
talked about the nature of Philosophy as a science and when he 
asked himself how it would be possible to conceive and realize a 
System that included living beings. One thing is indeed a science like 
Geometry, but definitely another thing is the Subject of philosophy, 
which is simply indefinable, because it is in incessant movement, 
since its essence is freedom. Talking about the subject of Philosophy, 
Schelling quotes here emphatically the evocative formula of Gospels: 
«Who will keep it, he will loose it, while who will abandon it, he 
will regain it». 
To this “epistemological” concern, Kierkegaard also dedicates the 
first lines of his Introduction to The Concept of Anxiety, a work where 
– together with Philosophical Fragments – the echoes of Schelling’s 
philosophy are more evident than elsewhere, even if the Danes will 
follow later another way. Here Kierkegaard tries first of all to cali-
brate, so to speak, his scientific instruments, right in order to avoid 
a philosophical launching that goes beyond its limits, running this 
way the risk to lose the object it wants to grasp:
9 Not11:9, in SKS 19, p. 313; Engl. trans. by Vanessa Rumble, Notebook 11, in Kierkeg-
aard’s Journals and Notebooks, Ed. by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hanay, David 
Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, George Pattison, Vanessa Rumble and Brian Söderquist, 
published in cooperation with the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, Copenhagen, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2007, vol. 3: Notebooks 1-15, p. 311.
10 Adolf Trendelenburg, Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System, Leipzig 1843, p. 13. 
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«By failing to proceed in a scientific manner and by 
not taking care to see that the individual issues do not 
outrun one another, as if it were a matter of arriving 
first at the masquerade, a person occasionally achieves 
a brilliance and amazes others by giving the impres-
sion that he has already comprehended that which is 
still very remote. At times he makes a vague agreement 
with things that differ. The gain is always avenged, as 
is every unlawful acquisition, which cannot be owned 
legally or scientifically. Thus when an author entitles 
the last section of the Logic “Actuality” he thereby 
gains the advantage of making it appear that in logic 
the highest has already been achieved, or if one pre-
fers, the lowest. In the meantime, the loss is obvious, 
for neither logic nor actuality is served by placing ac-
tuality in the Logic. Actuality is not served thereby, for 
contingency, which is an essential part of the actual, 
cannot be admitted within the realm of logic. […] In 
logic, the negative is used as the impelling power to 
bring movement into all things. One must have move-
ment in logic no matter how it is brought about, and 
no matter by what means. The negative lends a hand, 
and what the negative cannot accomplish, play on 
words and platitudes can, just as when the negative 
itself becomes a play on words. In logic, no move-
ment must come about, for logic is, and whatever is 
logical only is. This impotence of the logical consists 
in the transition of logic into becoming, where exis-
tence and actuality come forth. So when logic becomes 
deeply absorbed in the concretion of the categories, 
that which was from the beginning is ever the same. 
Every movement, if for the moment one wishes to use 
this expression, is an immanent movement, which 
in a profound sense is no movement at all. One can 
easily convince oneself of this by considering that the 
concept of movement is itself a transcendence that has 
no place in logic. The negative, then, is immanent in 
the movement, is something vanishing, is that which 
is annulled. If everything comes about in this manner, 
nothing comes about at all, and the negative becomes 
an illusion. Nevertheless, precisely in order to make 




something more; it becomes that which brings forth 
the opposition, not a negation but a contraposition.11 
In this work, Psychology will be Kierkegaard’s epistemological 
instrument in order to make possible a discourse on reality – and 
in this case the reality is the fact of Sin, that is, actually the fact of 
freedom itself. Psychology is in a sense the instrument thanks to 
which Kierkegaard thinks it is possible to talk about the negative. 
Through psychology the negative will be not grasped in its essence 
(that would be impossible), but it can be truly analyzed by a “phe-
nomenological” – we would say – point of view. In fact, Kierkegaard 
analyzes the only possible human understanding of the negative, not 
as an abstract concept, but in its existential reality: the idea of pos-
sibility, an idea that causes anxiety. We read in The Concept of Anxiety: 
«[…] no science can explain. Psychology comes closest 
and explains the last approximation, which is freedom’s 
showing-itself-for-itself in the anxiety of possibility, 
or in the nothing of possibility, or in the nothing of 
anxiety».12
«[…] what effect does Nothing have? It begets anxi-
ety. […] The actuality of the spirit constantly shows 
itself as a form that tempts its possibility but disappears 
as soon as it seeks to grasp for it, and it is a nothing that 
can only bring anxiety. […] Anxiety is freedom’s actual-
ity as the possibility of possibility. […] The possibility 
is to be able. In a logical system, it is convenient to say 
that possibility passes over into actuality. However, in 
actuality it is not so convenient, and an intermediate 
term is required. The intermediate term is anxiety, […]. 
Anxiety is neither a category of necessity nor a category 
of freedom; it is entangled freedom, where freedom is 
not free in itself but entangled, not by necessity, but 
in itself».13
 
Now, I want first to make clear that I will stop at this first step 
of Kierkegaard’s discourse, in order to make possible a comparison 
11 The Concept of Anxiety, Engl. trans. by Reidar Thomte in collaboration with 
Albert B. Anderson, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1997, pp. 9, 12-23; in SKS 
4, pp. 281-82, 285-86.
12 Ibid., p. 76; SKS 4, pp. 41-42.
13 Ibid. pp. 41-42; SKS 4, p. 347.
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between Kierkegaard and Schelling on this point. I mean, I will 
not enter into Kierkegaard’s discourse about Dogmatic, that is the 
bulwark against which Kierkegaard thinks it is necessary to stop, 
and this is exactly why he refused Schelling’s latest Philosophy of 
Revelation. Among other examples, we can read in this context that 
emblematic passage in a note of the Concept of Anxiety in which 
Kierkegaard rightly quoting Schelling’s lectures in Berlin, says «how 
strange everything becomes when metaphysics and dogmatics are distorted 
by treating dogmatics metaphysically and metaphysics dogmatically».14 
So, I will stop now at the first stage of Kierkegaard’s discourse, in 
order to show why Kierkegaard could have been so interested into 
Schelling’s latest speculation, and which elements he seems to have 
used in his own thought.
We were talking about Possibility: possibility is indeed not an ab-
solute nothing, but according to the Platonic distinction (m¾ Ôn), 
it is a relative one, and Kierkegaard will not investigate it through a 
metaphysical discourse, but through the “phenomenology” of the 
anxiety, that can be considered the human resonance of the only 
conceivable Nothing: not the inconsistent pure Nothing, but the 
relative and unpredictable one, at the root the human freedom. In 
Philosophical Fragments15 Kierkegaard actually talks about the Becom-
ing as a change that does not concern the essence, but being: it is 
a change from the not-existing to the existing. Still, this not-being 
that the becoming abandons, has to exist, otherwise one could not 
talk about a change, but about something else. So, such a being that 
nevertheless is a non-being is possibility.16
It is precisely thanks to the concept of not-being as possibility (that 
is something real, not the pure nothing) that Schelling could elabo-
rate – escaping from Hegel’s panlogism – his “positive philosophy”, 
a philosophy that according to his intent was founded on the his-
torical reality, whose essence is freedom… and indeed – as we read 
in Kierkegaard’s notes of Schelling’s lectures at the lecture no. 18: 
«One can never know what freedom will bring to light».17 Schelling 
had also presented during his lectures the distinction between m¾ 
Ôn e oÙk Ôn, in particular during the lecture that Kierkegaard in 
14 Ibid. p. 59; SKS 4 pp. 363-364, in the footnote.
15 Engl. transl. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 1985, p. 73; SKS 4, p. 273.
16 Ibid., p. 74; SKS 4, p. 274.




his notes numbers with no. 7, dating from the end of November.18
But in order to see how Kierkegaard made use of Schelling’s con-
cepts, I believe one should analyze Schelling’s foundation of the 
positive philosophy and understand what exactly it is. 
Schelling’s positive philosophy was founded on the basis of the 
so-called “philosophical empiricism,” a method that he started to 
elaborate in Erlangen and then developed later in the Darstellung 
des philosophischen Empirismus in 1836 and in Ueber den nationelle 
Gegensatz in der Philosophie of the same year. Schelling realized that 
he could have organized his speculation in a system that should 
have been articulated in five sections:
1. History and critics of the modern philosophy.
2. Exposition of the philosophical empiricism.
3. Theory of the Absolute.
4. Philosophy of Mythology.
5. Philosophy of Revelation.
The turning point in his speculation had been Hegel’s decisive 
development of the Idealism in the direction of the Logic (after the 
publication of works like the Science of Logic, 1812-16, and the The 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline, 1817). Thus he 
felt the necessity to elaborate a science that was, as we said, rational 
but at the same time positive, real, and historical.
Schelling stated that there were two different possible ways of 
considering Empiricism: the traditional one, which according to 
Kant rejects everything that goes beyond the limits of the sensible 
experience, and a higher one, that does not necessary negate the 
supernatural. «There exists, accordingly, an empiricism that, thought 
supersensible, is still empiricism – a metaphysical and not merely 
sensual empiricism», we also read in Kierkegaard’s notes of Schelling’s 
lecture 1719. But which is the nature of the object that the positive 
philosophy investigates? It is an object supernatural, but still know-
able only empirically. We read in the lectures 17 and 18:
«…a freely acting intelligence, for example, does not 
fall within the world of sense; nevertheless, it can be 
known only empirically. Likewise, a free intelligence 
beyond the world will only be knowable through That-
sachen [facts]. […] Positive philosophy is based neither 
on what is given in experience, nor on what is given 
exclusively for thought. Its principle is neither in ex-
18 Ibid., pp. 310-11; Eng. transl., cit., pp. 308-309.
19 Ibid., p. 326; Eng. transl., cit., p. 324.
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perience nor in pure thought. Its principle is absolute 
transcendence, which comes zuvor [before] thought as 
well as experience.»
Now, Schelling introduces a new element, the Prius. What is the 
nature of this Prius? In order to explain that, we have to come back 
to the first lectures of Schelling’s course, when he makes a survey on 
the meaning of the rational knowledge in the different stages of the 
thought. He had in fact divided his first course in Berlin in two parts:
1 – Introduction to the Philosophy of  Revelation or Foundation 
of Positive Philosophy.
2 – Philosophy of Revelation.20 
According to Schelling’s survey, Philosophy had historically 
reached the point when it divided itself in a negative and a positive 
one. Because everything that is real can be considered from two 
points of view: 
a) QUID SIT – WAS (the essence), that is “thing in its concept”.
b) QUOD SIT – DAß (the real existence, the fact that the thing is).
We can have the concept of something without its real existence, 
but never the contrary, therefore a real “knowing” is always a “recog-
nizing”, even if in this way we grasp only the QUID SIT of something, 
not its real existence. The Reason can only recognize the concept of 
something, not its real existence. Nevertheless, one cannot recognize 
a concept unless it is embodied in something existing. It means that 
concept and the existing object are one… but DAß, the fact of the 
existence of an object does not have any influence on the concept 
we have of that object, because the existence is something accidental 
that we grasp only with senses.
But sometimes it happens that the relation between reason and 
experience is missing, because experience is lacking. This is the case 
of supernatural objects. We can think back, in this case, to Kant’s 
critique to the ontological proof of the existence of God, where it is 
said that the concept of God does not prove his real existence. Kant 
actually recognized to the “positive” just the value of an exigency, 
but he does not accept its scientific value.
But Kant’s exclusion of the positive from philosophy, according 
to Schelling, cleared the way to Idealism, whereas philosophy will 
not only be Critique, but it becomes Science of the Reason. For the 
20 But Kierkegaard actually abandoned the course before Schelling started to ex-





first time with Fichte and his “transcendental Act” that posits “Ich 
bin”, we have a science which is completely a priori, where the only 
prius is the human Reason. In order words, reason becomes at the 
same time the subject who knows and the object which is known. 
Thus, Reason as the object of itself is: 1) infinite power of knowing, 
whose content a priori is 2) the infinite power of being, that is the im-
mediate concept of being. A concept that, for its nature, passes into 
being, since every thought when it is thought becomes being (in 
thought). When I think something, I give to my thought the reality 
of a concept. The thought, because it is thought, necessarily passes 
into being (even if it is only the being of a concept). But this passage 
is not a real movement, it is only a rational one. (See Kierkegaard’s 
Referat, lecture no. 321). This is actually the necessity that rules the 
realm of thought, where nothing can be thought without being in 
this way necessary. 
But how in this way one can think something which is totally free 
of being, but also free of not being? Because, as Schelling states «The 
authentic freedom means not just being, but also the possible deci-
sion of not being» (that is actually God’s decision to create the world 
and manifesting himself in it) [SW, II, 3, p. 209]. In other words, how 
we can think something real without making this really necessary 
by having thought it? How can we grasp the eternal mobility of the 
Becoming without turning it into stone with that glance of Medusa 
that Reason possesses? How to preserve that portion of relative not-
being that is the infinite power of being (the possibility)? How can 
the human being grasp and understand in its reality the Infinite 
power of being that is “das Seyende selbst” or the Prius? To arrive to 
the concept of “das Seyende selbst” as infinite power of being is the 
task of negative philosophy: but if we can grasp it as a concept, how 
to grasp the reality of something that because totally free of being 
and not being (a reality that comes before every possibility) is also 
outside of thinking? Schelling calls it unvordenkliche Seyn, which is 
something “immemorial”, it means not thinkable. This is actually 
the Prius from which the positive philosophy starts. But if we cannot 
think it, how will the positive philosophy start? It will start from 
something that is, and this being is “das Seyende selbst” as power, 
that is God, who has decided to reveal himself through Creation, 
which is something empirical, thus something that human being 
can grasp. We read in lecture no. 22 in Berlin that the absolute Prius 
has not the necessity of moving into being, so if it does it, it does 
21 SKS 19, pp. 305-307; Engl. transl., cit., pp. 303-305.
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just through a free action and we can know it only as something 
empirical, that is something we can know a posteriori. 
We can find Schelling’s method in lecture no. 18:
«Positive Philosophy is thus not empiricism in the 
sense that it arises from experience; neither is it based 
on an immediate given, nor does it arise from a given, 
through [a series of] conclusions. Rather, it arrives at 
experience, and demonstrates its prius a posteriori. Its 
difference from empiricism is then sufficiently clear, 
but is it not then identical to negative philosophy? 
Negative Philosophy takes what exists in experience 
as the object of possible knowledge; the a posteriori, 
which it discovered a priori, remains outside itself; if it 
accords with experience, all the better, but the truth of 
its constructions rests on an inner immanence. Positive 
Philosophy arrives and enters into experience. The a 
posteriori is not elicited from experience; it arises from 
the absolute prius, and the a posteriori is derived from 
it by free thought (negative philosophy has necessary 
thought), as the actual rather than the merely possi-
ble. It is not the absolute prius that soll erwiesen werden 
[ought to be proven] but its consequence.»22
[…]
«We will say: the Prius whose concept is this and this 
can freely produce a particular sequence if it wants. 
Now, this sequence exists (is a fact of the experience). 
Thus this fact – the existence of this sequence – shows 
us that even the Prius itself exist exactly like we had 
understood it.»23 
But we have to notice that with the word “experience”, that is 
the facts, Schelling means the whole experience, the whole his-
tory, which is something that is never ended, that is why we talk 
about Philo-sophy and not just about “sofia”. And it is worth in this 
context to quote Schelling’s words in lecture no. 22 when he recalls 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Plato’s Theaetus where they said initium 
22 Ibid., p. 327; Engl. transl., cit., p. 325.




philosophiae est admiratio,24 a famous passage that even Kierkegaard 
also quotes in his Journal in these years, when he writes that «It is a 
positive point of departure for philosophy when Aristotle  believes 
that philosophy begins with wonder and not, as in our times, with 
doubt. The world will certainly come to learn that it doesn’t do to 
begin with the negative […]».25
It means that the real object of the positive philosophy cannot be 
the object of a definite and concluded proof, like it was God of the 
old metaphysics, whose existence was demonstrated through the 
existence of his creatures. We cannot demonstrate him, because its 
essence is freedom, and one can never know what freedom will bring 
forth: the most difficult thing for philosophy is indeed to understand 
the possibility. In a sense we can say with Schelling that the whole 
philosophy (the positive philosophy) is a never ended proof of the 
existence of God.
In his Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen,26 Schelling said that «The cross 
for every philosophy is the investigation of the essence of the not-
being [that is the possibility]. We always try to grasp it, but in vain». 
The same wrote Kierkegaard in its Journal, when he stated that «Free-
dom is the cross that philosophy is unable to bear».27
Coming back to our initial problem: we have seen that both 
Schelling and Kierkegaard emphasize the same difficulty for philoso-
phy, that is the difficulty of a scientific discourse which pretends to 
include reality in a system, that is something constantly “possible” 
and never completed. To include something in a system means – as 
we saw – to transform it, through rational comprehension, in some-
thing that is necessary, it means to misrepresent it.  Nevertheless, 
Schelling had even been able to include the not-being in its system, 
taking it as something existing, but in the way of possibility. 
This is the same problematic point that Kierkegaard emphasizes 
in the Interlude of the Philosophical Fragments, when he talks about 
historical comprehension: 
«Everything that comes into existence demonstrates 
that it is not necessary, for the only thing that can-
not come into existence is the necessary, because the 
necessary is. […] The change of coming into existence 
24 SKS 19, p. 335; Engl. transl. cit., p. 333.
25 Not 7:21, in SKS 19, p. 211; Engl. transl. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, in Kierkegaard’s 
Journals and Notebooks, op. cit., p. 207.
26 SW, I, VII, p. 436.
27 Journalen FF:149 (1838), in SKS 18, p. 103.
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is actuality; the transition takes place in freedom. No 
coming into existence is necessary.»28 […]  
But if through the understanding we transform something which 
has become (the past) in something necessary, we lose the object we 
wanted to grasp: «If what is apprehended is changed in the apprehen-
sion, then the apprehension is changed into a misunderstanding »29. 
In a sense Kierkegaard uses the conceptuality of Schelling, but in 
order to reach the opposite result. The intent was at the beginning 
the same, Kierkegaard put all his confidence in Schelling as he states 
in a famous passage of his notebooks30, and therefore also tries to 
improve Schelling’s instruments; however, he cannot follow the old 
philosopher exactly in that crucial point of his philosophy that is 
the point of contact between positive and negative philosophy, a 
point on which Shelling himself got stuck during the long years of 
elaboration of his System. 
As Kierkegaard writes still in the Philosophical Fragments, «the dif-
ficulty is to grasp factual being (factual experience) and to bring 
God’s ideality into factual being».31 
The human being can thus think the Being, but he cannot under-
stand it, determine it, because being is something from which he 
is transcended: nevertheless by thinking it, the human being can 
attest its presence, even if «There is no Here and no There, but only an 
ubique et nusquam [everywhere and nowhere]».32
Schelling explained that the negative philosophy gave to the posi-
tive the “true being” as its latest result, the purus actus, the unvorden-
kliche Seyn, an absolute being that only if it really exists, it is. And it 
really exists, because our senses testify that, and they testify exactly 
what we had conceived. But the point for Kierkegaard is that not 
28 SKS 4, pp. 274-275; Eng. transl., cit., pp. 72, 75.
29 Ibid., p. 279; Engl. trans. cit., pp. 79-80. 
30  Notesbog 8:33 (1841), in SKS 19, p. 235; Engl. transl. by Alastair Hannay, in 
Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, cit., p. 229: «I’m so glad to have heard Schelling’s 
2nd lecture – indescribable. I have been sighing and the thoughts within me have 
been groaning long enough; when he mentioned the word “actuality” concerning 
pgilosophy’s relation to the actual, the child of thought leaped for joy within me as 
in Elizabeth. After that I remember almost every word he said. Perhaps here there can 
be clarity. This one word, it reminded me of all my philosophical pains and agonies. 
[…] Now I have put all my hope in Schelling […].»
31 SKS 4, p. 247; Engl. transl. cit., p. 42.




only does not the conceptual knowledge of this pure Being (that is 
the knowledge of its possibility) mean that this Being exists neces-
sarily, but the contrary is also true: the fact that this Being is does not 
necessarily mean that it is the “necessary Being”.33 In this space, the 
possibility of a passage is not given, but it is just possible to leap 
with fear and trembling by virtue of faith.
According to Kierkegaard, faith is indeed the only organ thanks to 
which is it possible to understand historical reality:
« The organ for the historical must be formed in 
likeness to this, must have within itself the correspond-
ing something by which in its certitude it continually 
annuls the incertitude that corresponds to the uncer-
tainty of coming into existence - a double uncertainty: 
the nothingness of non-being and the annihilated pos-
sibility, which is also the annihilation of every other 
possibility. This is precisely the nature of belief – for 
continually present as the nullified in the certitude of 
belief is the incertitude that in every way corresponds 
to the uncertainty of coming into existence. Thus, belief 
believes what it does not see».34 
The position of the human being within the existence is well 
described by a famous passage of the Postscript, where Kierkegaard 
says that:
«For the existing person, existing is for him his 
highest interest, and his interestedness in existing is 
his actuality. What actuality is cannot be rendered in 
the language of abstraction. Actuality is an inter-esse 
[between-being] between thinking and being in the hy-
pothetical unity of abstraction. Abstraction deals with 
possibility and actuality, but its conception of actuality 
is a false rendition, since the medium is not actuality 
but possibility.» [Postscript, Hongs’ p. 314]
 Only a reason able to be praeter se, an ecstatic Reason, so to 
speak could arrive to conceive the unvordenkliche Sein, that is the 
Prius, able to be or not to be if it wants: that is a Reason, which in 
a sense is itself divine. According to Schelling, indeed, a theory of 
Revelation, in order that the Revelation is understandable, presup-
33 Ibid., pp. 245-248; Engl. transl. cit., pp. 40-43.
34 Ibid., pp. 280-81; Engl. transl. cit., p. 81.
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poses an already existing original relationship between God and 
human consciousness, that precedes the Revelation itself and that 
develops itself through the different degrees of Mythology. 
This is something that Kierkegaard absolutely refuses, and he to 
Schelling’s position opposes his subjective existing thinker in its «abys-
mal qualitative difference» from God.
And against the speculation he recalled the Socratic ignorance, 
«… which guards faith against speculation, keeping 
watch so that the gulf of qualitative difference between 
God and man may be maintained as it is in the paradox 
and faith, so that God and man do not, even more 
dreadfully than ever in paganism, do not merge in some 
way, philosophice, poetice, etc., into one–in the system.»35
Ingrid Basso
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[Article aprovat per a la seva publicació el febrer de 2012]
35  Sickness unto Death, in SKS 11, p. 211: Engl. transl. by Howard V. Hong and Edna 
H. Hong, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1980, p. 99.
